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THE INSURANCE OF MEDICAL LOSSES
RICHARD S. L. RODDIS* AND RIcHARD E. STEWART**
We are educated by the American creed of accomplishment to
believe that every problem, however defined, is susceptible to solution
through the application of reasoned effort. Difficult problems simply
are those which demand greater measures of reasoned effort to achieve
solution. As a corollary, it is supposed that difficulty and complexity
are the same, so that a difficult problem must be a complex problem.
Resignation to unsatisfying states of affairs is not a prized trait in
the American character. Hence, when a difficult problem proves in-
tractable despite the earnest expenditure of enough reasoned effort to
overcome complexity, an almost automatic response is to proceed to
expose villains, whose dishonesty, stupidity, or greed have subverted
reasoned effort.
DEFINING THE BOUNDS OF THE PROBLEM
The medical malpractice insurance problem has captured the atten-
tion of the body politic.' It is analyzed in the daily newspapers. It is
the subject of extended conferences and studies by a great array of
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THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973) [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE REPORT].
1. See STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH
CONG., IST SEsS., AN OVERVIEW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (Comm. Print 1975). For
a discussion of state legislative efforts to deal with the problem, see Comment, An Anal-
ysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUnn LJ.
1417.
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experts.' Various legislatures either have or are planning to conduct
special sessions to deal only with it.8 In pursuit of a solution, there is no
want of reasoned effort. Yet it remains a difficult problem of baffling
complexity and the search for villains is intense. The fact of the matter
is that the medical malpractice insurance problem is not particularly
complex and villainy plays only a minor role in it. That does not mean,
however, that it is not an intractable problem-at least if its solution
takes the form in which any of the organized, involved groups cast it.
The Medical Loss Question Generally
Although this Article will concentrate on medical malpractice in its
insurance aspect, that aspect, unavoidably parochial, is no place to
begin. We will understand the insurance aspect better if we look first at
the broader subject, of which insurance is a part. The subject is the
totality of the legal and business arrangements provided by our society
for allocating the financial burden of the losses occurring in the adminis-
tration of health care. For our purposes, a medical loss occurs whenev-
er a person submits to diagnosis, advice, or treatment (including non-
treatment) from one or more professional or institutional providers of
health care and winds up being in worse condition than if measures of
diagnosis, advice, or treatment other than the ones pursued had been
administered.
This definition of loss is very broad, being cast solely in terms of
health care causation. It says nothing about whether the loss was
culpably caused or about its economic valuation. Loss, so defined, is
not the same as legal liability for damages and is not the loss with which
the providers' insurers are concerned. All conceptions of loss which go
beyond this rudimentary definition are to a greater or lesser extent a
product of decisions made in the processes of the legal and business
arrangements created by society for determining how the financial im-
pacts of the original loss shall be allocated.
It is mportant to think of the loss valuation, allocation, and distri-
bution arrangements prescribed by the society as a total and interrelated
system.4 There is always a loss allocation system, even in a hypothetical
society which makes no provision, formal or informal, for shifting or
2. See, e.g., HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH Am ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE (Subcomm. Print 1975).
3. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1975, at 53, col. 3; id. July 1, 1975, at 32, col. 1.
4. See generally G. CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
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distributing the burden of loss. In such a society, all loss is allocated by
default so as to stay with the person (and his dependents) upon whom
it first fell. The legal structure, both by its prescribed substantive and
procedural rules and by the actual operation of its processes, merely
functions to value and allocate the financial burden of medical loss.
Similarly, the array of insurance and other private and governmental
financial arrangements merely functions further to reallocate -and dis-
tribute the financial consequences of loss. All of the components of the
system interact in ways which progressively alter the economic meaning
of loss, fragmenting, shifting, and dispersing the impact of the loss in
a myriad of directions.
This can be illustrated by an example. A patient, whose condition
has been worsened in the sense we originally postulated as a medical
loss, asserts a claim against his physician contending that the physician
performed with less than the appropriate level of competence. Because
of his worsened condition, the patient incurred $5,000 of additional
medical expenses and lost $5,000 of income which he otherwise would
have earned. He also experienced pain and inconvenience which, after
consultation with his lawyer, he decided was worth $20,000. In some
other cultures, pain and inconvenience would not be treated as economi-
cally cognizable loss but our society adheres to the notion that these
psychic detriments are susceptible to economic valuation for compensa-
tion purposes. 5
The additional medical expense has been paid by the patient's
experience-rated, employer-provided group medical plan and $2,000 of
the lost earnings has been reimbursed under a disability income policy
individually purchased by the patient. Eventually, a trial results in a
judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $15,000. Of this amount,
$7,500 goes to recompense the plaintiff's lawyer, who handled the case
on a contingent fee basis, and to pay other expenses of prosecuting the
claim. Another $2,500 goes to the group health plan in agreed satisfac-
tion of its contractual subrogation claim. In addition to paying the
judgment, the physician's malpractice insurer has expended $5,000 in
defense of the claim.
The amounts expended by the malpractice insurer eventually are
reflected as a component of the future rates paid by the physician and
others in his rate class. To the extent the insurer's rates are inadequate,
the cost is borne indirectly by shareholders or other classes of policy-
holders. Since the physician considers his insurance costs in determin-
ing the appropriate level of his fees, those costs are passed on to his
5. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 88 (1935).
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patient population in substantial part, though perhaps subject to some
adjustment lag. To the extent that they are not passed on as fee
increases, they are borne partly by the physician as a reduction in net
income and partly by other income taxpayers generally since the insur-
ance premiums are a deductible business expense. 6 To the extent
malpractice insurance premiums are passed on as a component of
patient fees, the greater part winds up being paid by the various private
and governmental health care expense reimbursement systems covering
the patient population. 7 The net amounts paid by the group health plan
are absorbed into future rates charged to the employer by the plan and
eventually reflected in the prices paid by the public for the employer's
products. Viewed as a labor cost, the costs of the plan are borne by
employees as a substitute for what might have been negotiated as higher
wages.8 The amount paid by the disability insurance carrier is reflected
in its future rates and distributed over its insured population.
There are two points to all of this. First, "loss" appears in several
perspectives and forms. The patient thought his loss was $30,000, but
if we assume that the jury thought it was compensating him initially for
out-of-pocket costs and then for pain and suffering, his loss has been
valued at $15,000. Of course, the jury may also have discounted the
amount of damages because of uncertainty on the liability issue,9 just as
other juries may magnify the pain and suffering award in cases where
they view the physician's conduct as morally, rather than merely techni-
cally, culpable. 10 And the jury may have been consciously attempting
to shift a portion of the patient's presumed legal expenses." In any
6. INT. RyV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a).
7. A study of health care expenditures indicated that government programs con-
tributed 37.6 percent of total personal health care expenditures in 1974, while private
health insurers paid 25.6 percent of the national total. Worthington, National Health
Care Expenditures, 1929-74, 38 Soc. SEc. BuLL. 3, 16 (Table 6) (Feb. 1975).
8. Cf. Larson, Sex Discrimination As To Maternity Benefits, 1975 DUKEr L.J 805,
818.
9. Kalven, The Jury, The Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Omo
ST. L.J. 158, 167 (1958). Where the trial judge or an appellate court is able to deter-
mine that a jury's damage award represents a compromise on the liability issue, the ver-
dict will be overturned. See, e.g., Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 571-72, 97 N.E.
102, 106 (1912) ($200 award for the loss of an eye by a 21-year-old man overturned
as a compromise on the liability issue). See also J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTrcE
59.0814], at 59-127 to 59-128 n.13 (2d ed. 1974).
10. Kalven, supra note 9, at 165-67; Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19
OHIo ST. L.J. 200, 206 (1958); see also Van Gordon v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 834
(W.D. Mo. 1950).
11. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROn. 219, 234-35 (1953); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 5, at 277. For a criti-
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event, the patient did not come off badly with a net recovery of $12,000,
but of course $4,500 came from sources other than the physician's
insurer."2 Loss (including the expenses of allocating and otherwise
administering the loss) from the standpoint of the malpractice insurer
was $20,000.1 Total loss passing through all insurance systems was in
excess of $27,000, again including loss administration expense. 14
Second, the loss ultimately was widely, though perhaps not very
efficiently, dispersed over random elements of the whole population.
Only in a very narrow perspective can one think of the economic
consequences of the situation simply in terms of a loss paid by the
malpractice insurer and premiums paid by -physicians. The real result
accomplished by the total loss allocation and distribution system is much
broader.
The Insurance Question Generally
In order to write any specified line of casualty insurance coverages
an insurer must make a commitment of capital and possess the special-
ized organizational capability to deal with the line. The necessity for
capital commitment results from the social mandate of solidity in the
insurance enterprise, 15 and from the regulatory accounting requirement
that the insurer initially establish the full amount of the premium for a
policy as a liability ("unearned premium reserve") although it incurs
most of the expenses attendant to the underwriting of the policy at the
outset.' 6
cism of this jury tendency, see Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUm. L.
REv. 476, 477 (1959).
12. From the jury award of $15,000, the patient has received $5,000 ($15,000 less
$7,500 for the lawyer and the subrogated $2,500). In addition, he has received $5,000
from the group medical plan and $2,000 in disability income, for a total of $12,000.
The $4,500 from other sources consists of the $2,000 disability income and the net
$2,500 payment from the group health plan.
13. The figure represents the $15,000 award and the $5,000 litigation expense.
14. Of the total, $20,000 passed through the malpractice insurer, $5,000 through the
medical group plan, and $2,000 through the disability income policy.
15. J. HANSON, R. DiNEEN & M. JOHNsON, MONrrrOING COMPETITION: A MEANs
OF RFGuLATNG THE PROPERTY AND LrU1LiTY INSURANCE BusInESS 92-93 (1974). See
Kimball, The Regulation of Insurance, in INsURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SocIAL POLICY
3, 5-6 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969); Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance
Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REv.
471, 477-78 (1961).
16. See E. PATERSON, EssETIALS OF INSURANCE LAw 25 (2d ed. 1957):
The unearned premium reserve at the date of the [financial] statement is the
amount that would be needed by the insurer to repay all holders of outstand-
ing insurance contracts if on that date the insurer elected to cancel all such
contracts and to refund, as the contracts required, "pro rata," i.e. that propor-
tion of the premium paid that the period then to be run bears to the total
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The goal of financial stability for the insurance enterprise further
dictates that an insurer maintain a reasonably proportionate relationship
between premium volume and surplus. Given a stable level of prem-
ium writings without net loss,' 8 the potential surplus drain of new
writings is offset by the recapture from reserve of the prepaid expense
on earlier policies.1 9 But expansion of the level of premium writings
results in a net drain on surplus unless surplus concurrently is augment-
ed either through the commitment of additional capital from external
sources or through the realization of net profits from underwriting and
investment operations.20 By the same token, erosion of surplus result-
ing from net losses in underwriting and investment operations reduces
the potential volume of insurance which the insurer can write. Hence,
although the relationship between premium volume and surplus is not a
rigidly prescribed one and is influenced by a number of other variables,
there is a point at which either expansion of writings or surplus erosion
from operational losses constrains further writings. Viewed either from
the standpoint of an individual insurer or of the industry as a whole,
there is an ultimate limit which the total capital committed to the
insurance enterprise imposes on the aggregate volume of its insurance
period of risk prescribed in the contract. This is usually the largest single
liability item in such an insurer's balance sheet.
The laws of all states require companies writing certain kinds of insurance, such as fire
and property, to maintain unearned premium reserves. See R. MEmt & E. CAMMACK,
PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 829 (4h ed. 1966). See also MICH. COMeP. LAws § 500.808
(Supp. 1975).
17. See Hofflander, Minimum Capital and Surplus Requirements for Multiple Line
Insurance Companies: A New Approach, in INSURANCE, Govw MENT AND SOCIAL
POLICY, supra note 15, at 69; R. KENNEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF FIRE AND CASUALTY
STRENGTH (4th ed. 1967). For a criticism of use of the ratio of premium written to
surplus as a test of financial solidity, see Beckman & Tremelling, The Relationship Be-
tween Net Premium Written and Policyholders' Surplus, 59 PROCEEDINGS CASUALTY Ac-
TUARIAL Soc. 203 (1972). For a simplified numerical analysis of the effects of premium
volume on surplus, see R. HENSLEY, COMPEITION, REGULATION, AND THE PUBLIC INTER-
nST IN NONLIFE INSURANCE 160 (1962).
18. Profit and loss in the insurance industry is essentially a product of four factors.
Income is derived from underwriting profits (i.e., earned premiums) and return on in-
vestments; expenses are incurred through the cost of operations and payment of policy-
holder losses. Net loss is simply the excess of expenses over income for any period.
See generally R. HENSLEY, supra note 17, at 171 et seq.
19. Unearned premium reserves are "recaptured" from their separate liability status
with the passage of time. For example, a one-year policy with a $120 premium is
wholly a liability on the date the insurance takes effect. Three months later, however,
$30 has been recaptured to pay expenses, and $90 remains in the liability (unearned
premium reserve) account. See R. MEHa & E. CAMwAcK, supra note 16, at 845.
20. For a recent general discussion of factors which influence this relationship, see
Forbes, Capital and Surplus Formation in the Nonlife Insurance Industry, 1956-70, 14
Q. REv. EcoN. & Bus. 15 (Autumn 1974).
1286 [Vol. 1975:1281
MEDICAL LOSS INSURANCE
writings, and that ultimate limit is called "capacity" in the insurance
lexicon.21
But money is both fungible and fluid, and in real life the practical
capacity of the insurance markets to supply the demand for particular
insurance coverages is not so much a function of the ultimate financial
limit described above as it is of a complex of managerial decisions as to
the allocation of capital and other corporate resources.
Crass though it may seem, profitability is the critical, though not
the exclusive, factor in this decision-making.22  The insurance enter-
prise, whether thought of as an individual company or as the aggregate
of all insurers, can preserve and expand the surplus necessary to meet
the growing appetite of our society for insurance coverages of every type
only by profitable operations. Profits both directly contribute to surplus
and make it possible to attract additional capital from other sources.
Though the proposition is so obvious that we hesitate to risk giving
needless offense by openly stating it, the unfortunate historical fact is
that large segments of the public, many politicians, and an embarrass-
ingly large number of people intimately connected with the insurance
business have behaved as if it were not true.
An insurer can derive profits in two ways-from underwriting
operations which result in a combination of losses and expenses less than
the amount of premiums received, and from favorable results in the
investment of funds under the control of the insurer. Insurers also can
lose money on both the underwriting and investment sides of the busi-
ness.
During the past twenty years, underwriting results in the property
and casualty business have been uneven in time, by line, and geographi-
cally.28  There have been long stretches in which many insurers have
experienced heavy underwriting losses in lines, such as automobile
21. See Hershbarger, Insurance Underwriting Capacity: A Psychometric Approach,
42 J. RIsK & INS. 51, 52-53 (1975); R. HENSLEY, supra note 17, at 156 et seq.
22. See Ehre, Is There an Insurance Capacity Crisis?, 33 J. INs. 8, 10 (Mar./Apr.
1972); Johnson, Seamanship for the 70's, 35 J. INS. 8, 11 (Sept./Oct. 1974). For the
development of one profit-maximizing model for insurers, see Spellman, Witt & Rentz,
Investment Income and Non-Life Insurance Pricing, 42 J. RISK & INs. 567 (1975).
The profitability factor plays its weightiest role during times of insufficient capacity
to meet the demand for insurance, as in the post-World War II period in the United
States. See R. Mom & E. CAMMACK, supra note 16, at 845.
23. See Kinder, A Look at the Leaders: Was Anyone A Winner in 1974?, BEsT'S
REv., PROP./LIAmriY INs. 18 (July 1975). Cf. Bateman, The Prospect Before Us,
33 J. INs. 2, 3 (July/Aug. 1972); Menist, The Future Begins Today, 33 J. INS. 2
(Mar./Apr. 1972). For new data on industry performance, see BEST's AGGREGATES &
AvERAGEs (Liability and Property).
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insurance,24 which constitute important segments of the total market.
For most of the same period of time, however, underwriting losses have
been offset by investment gains. 25 There have been few periods when
insurers generally have experienced broad underwriting losses and ad-
verse investment results at the same time.
In the sensible economics of times gone by, there probably was
logic to the historical pattern. The technique of insurance ratemaking
(with its emphasis on past experience as the chief basis for predicting
costs), coupled with competitive euphoria and regulatory lag, causes
inflation to have deadly effects on underwriting results. But in the past
that same inflation tended to be accompanied by increases in the value
of equity securities in which property-casualty insurers invested larger
and larger proportions of their portfolios.
The emergence of the perverse economics of the 1970s, with
inflation and recession occurring together for an extended period of time
and even to some extent causing each other,2 6 has destroyed the comfort
derived by insurance managements and insurance regulators from the
familiar stabilizing effect of the alternating economic swings in under-
writing and investment results. The years 1974 and 1975 have been
underwriting and investment disasters for the property and casualty
insurance business unparalleled since the 1930s, if ever.
The effect of these events on the psychology of insurer manage-
ments cannot be underestimated. Gone is the heavy orientation toward
volume at all costs which had resulted from over-reliance on the equity
investment gains to be derived from cash-flow expansion. In a word,
there is present in the insurance business a pervasive "Back to Basics"
movement. And the basic principle which the managers have discov-
ered is that those who wish to endure in the business of writing insur-
24. Automobile insurers experienced a $1.4 billion underwriting loss during the
decade of the 1960s. Johnson, supra note 22, at 9.
25. See Levey, Balancing Investment and Underwriting Risks, 76 BEST's REV.,
PRoP./IjABiLrrY INs. 10 (Sept. 1975); cf. Forbes, supra note 20.
26. CouNcL OF ECONOMIC ADvIsoRs, ECONOMIc REPORT OF THE PnRsmENrr 19
(Feb. 1975).
27. The property and casualty insurance industry lost more than $2.5 billion in
1974. 1974 Underwriting Results By Line of Business, BEsT's Rrv., PRoP./LABnxrY
INs. 10 (May 1975). See Herman, Damage Insurers Hit by Losses on Stocks, Rise in
Claim Amounts, Wall Street I., Jan. 20, 1975, at 1, col. 6. The industry performance
in 1975 was expected to be at least as dismal, with loss estimates ranging as high as $4
billion. Daenzer, A Look Into the Future, BEST'S REV., PROP./LIAnLrrY INs. 26 (Dec.
1975); Walker, Looking Behind the Property/Liability Bloodbath, BEST's REV., PROP./
LIABILITY INs. 21 (Nov. 1975); 79 NATIONAL UNDERwRrrER, Sept. 19, 1975, at 1.
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ance contracts must sell those contracts for prices which are adequate to
cover the attendant losses and expenses.28
Malpractice Insurance
Medical malpractice insurance is simply a specialized form of
liability insurance. Although there are specialty carriers writing only
this coverage,2 9 most of it is written by large multiple-line property and
casualty insurers. 0 Those insurers write or have the opportunity to
write a wide variety of insurance coverages both in the personal and
commercial markets. Insurance lines may be classified not only by
reference to the type of risk insured, such as fire, legal liability, interrup-
tion of business, theft, or defalcation, but also by reference to the na-
ture of the activities or properties from which the risks of loss arise. The
writing of fire insurance, for example, on urban residences, farms,
cheese factories, and lumber mills constitutes disparate insuring opera-
tions each requiring some degree of specialized organizational compe-
tence. The design of policy forms, the development of rates, the
evaluation of risks, the orientation of the marketing force, and the
adjustment of losses all require functional specialization of an insurer's
personnel directed toward the particular circumstances of the subject
areas in which writings are concentrated. If one wants to write fire
insurance on cheese factories, and wind up with more money than
grilled cheese, it is helpful to know a good deal about the cheese busi-
ness.
The writing of any specialty line of coverage requires the allocation
of resources to develop the competence to handle the line. It also
requires the willingness to absorb the increments to the general expenses
and the losses of the insurance operation which the specialization of
function imposes until such time as it may be supposed that the line will
generate a sufficient volume of premiums at rates adequate to carry
those expenses and losses. Given the enormous technical and legal
complexities involved, the foregoing principles are preeminently applica-
ble to the writing of insurance against the occupational liabilities of
individuals and institutions engaged in providing health care.
28. See A.M. Best Co., Comment on the State of and Prospects for the Property!
Liability Insurance Industry, Bns'rs REv., PRoP./I ABnLmr INs. 10, 90-91 (June 1975);
Walker, supra note 27, at 24, 78.
29. One such specialty carrier is Medical Protective Company. Hendricks, What
Your Next Malpractice Policy May Look Like, MED. ECON., Apr. 14, 1975, at 29, 30.
30. See Hastings, Medical Malpractice Background Paper, in STAFF OF Comm. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, supra note 1, at 16; Kendall & Haldi, The Medical
Malpractice Insurance Market, in MrnIcAI. MALPRACICE REPORT Appendix 522.
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One further observation is appropriate concerning the attitudes of
insurer managements or, indeed, of anyone else trying to make profita-
ble choices among competing alternatives for the commitment of limited
capital and human resources. The managers are prone to view profita-
bility in relation to an assessment of investment risk, meaning the
perceived degree of uncertainty as to the desired outcome.31 The
greater the risk, the higher will be the projected rate of return necessary
to induce a decision to commit capital and other limited resources to
that venture rather than to some other one seen as promising more
certain gain.
In the "Back to Basics" climate of insurer management these
days,32 it is understandable that relative certainty and predictive stability
in underwriting results may be much prized as a characteristic of any
line. This is particularly true because historical experience has tended
to make insurer managements skeptical about the feasibility of ever
deriving really substantial underwriting profits for very long on any of
the major, publicly sensitive classes of property or casualty insurance. A
combination of regulatory, competitive, and political pressures effec-
tively stifles the opportunity for sustained yield of high underwriting
profits, at least for the industry as a whole. The property and casualty
insurance business, whatever it may once have been, is not now to be
counted among the industries where one is encouraged to risk disas-
ter by the lure of making a killing.
In this light, it is fair to inquire into the experience which the
property and casualty insurers have had with medical malpractice insur-
ance and into the types of problems insurance managers may perceive in
it.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RATES FOR MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
The principal coverage with which we are concerned is Physicians
Malpractice Insurance, also known as the Medical Professional Liability
Policy. As generally written today, it is a very broad and unexceptional
form of insurance against costs of defense and liability for damages
arising out of the rendering or failure to render the described profession-
al services during the policy period. 33 In addition to the basic coverage
31. See generally V. BRUDNEY & M. CINELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COR-
PORATE FINANCE 56-66 (1972); B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTME, SECURITY ANALYSIS
48-52, 664-65 (4th ed. 1962).
32. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
33. A typical insuring clause reads as follows:
Payment on behalf of the insured because of injury arising out of:
(a) malpractice, error, or mistake in rendering or failing to render professional
services in the practice of the insured's profession committed during the
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for the liabilities arising from the professional conduct of the individual
physician insured, the policy also covers the vicarious liability of the
physician for the professional acts or omissions of others for whom the
physician is legally responsible by reason of a relationship such as that
of employer and employee.34  This is not an "omnibus clause,"3 and
does not extend the insurance protection to the other person but rather is
intended only to cover the vicarious liability of the named insured.
Finally, the form specifically provides coverage for liabilities arising
from the insured's participation in professionally related collective activi-
ties such as membership on institutional staff committees and accredita-
tion boards .3
In the usual form, there are only two specified exclusions from the
coverage. The first is for the vicarious liability of the physician as a
member of a partnership, stated as an exception in the insuring clause.
37
The second is a specific exclusion from the policy of the liability of the
insured as owner or executive official of a hospital, sanitarium, in-
patient clinic, laboratory, or business enterprise. Both of these are
intended to avoid duplication of coverages ordinarily provided under
other commonly extant policies. However, it is common to extend the
coverage of the individual policy, either by endorsement or other policy
provision, to the physician's partnership liability,3" and recently to the
liability of his professional corporation.
There are, of course, variations in policy coverage and language
and some forms are more restrictive. However, we think the foregoing
describes a typical coverage and suggests the breadth of the coverage
which has evolved in response to the needs of the physicians.
policy period by the insured or any other person for whose acts or omis-
sions the insured is legally liable;
(b) acts or omissions committed by the insured during the policy period as a
member of a formal accreditation or similar professional board or com-
mittee of a hospital or professional society. Parish, Professional Liability
Insurance, in PROPERTY AND LABLiTY INsuRAmcE HABooK 478, 484(J. Long & D. Gregg eds. 1965).
Other examples of insuring clauses can be found in 1 R. LONG, THE LAv OF LAm=rry
INsuRANcE § 12.02 (1975); 2 D. LoUISELL & H. WiLLrAMs, MEDci. MALPRACTICE f
20.03, at 589 n.25 (1974); McNeal, Patients, Litigation and Patience, 33 INS. COUNSEL
J. 408 (1966).
34. See note 33 supra.
35. An omnibus clause extends protection to persons other than the named insured,
under specified circumstances. It is seen frequently in automobile liability policies. 1
R. LONG, supra note 33, § 3.01. See generally Ratcliffe, The Omnibus Clause, 39 1.
RisK & INS. 457 (1972).
36. See note 33 supra.
37. For an example of such an exclusion, see Shehee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 122 F. Supp. 1, 7 (W.D. La. 1954). See also 1 R. LONG, supra note 33, § 12.03.
38. See 1 R. LONG, supra note 33.
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An obvious characteristic of insurance is that ordinarily the price is
set before the cost is known. In medical malpractice insurance the cost
is not known for a very, very long time. For a variety of reasons the
discovery, assertion, and eventual disposition of malpractice claims tends
to stretch over a period of many years after the close of the period of
policy coverage." In addition, the experience of the past ten years has
shown that the pattern of frequency and cost of claims as they emerged
were not susceptible to prediction by accepted and systematic actuarial
techniques.4"
An understanding of the problems involved in the pricing of
malpractice insurance may be aided by a description of the actuarial
concepts and methods employed and the difficulties which the actuaries
encounter in this line.4
The procedures of the actuary are conceptually simple. He starts
with a body of past experience sufficient to make him feel comfortable
about the "credibility" of the data.42  He brings the premium compo-
nent of the experience to "current level," i.e. the dollars that the expo-
sures or insured entities would generate at today's rate schedules. He
may do this by factoring the historical premiums to account for rate
changes imposed between then and now, or he may more accurately deal
with the historical exposures and rerate them at today's prices, a process
called "extending exposures at current level." 43  Then he turns his
attention to the losses. His concern is how these losses would look if
they were incurred during the period when the new rates to be produced
will be in effect. He adjusts the historical losses in two ways. First he.
39. MEDICAL MALPRACTCE REPORT 42; Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, Medical Mal-
practice Insurance Claims Files Closed in 1970, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPoRT Ap-
pendix 1, 9. A representative of a professional liability insurer covering New York
physicians reported that less than half the losses incurred in a given policy year had
been finally determined five years later, and that a "substantial number" remained unde-
termined ten years after occurrence. HousE StBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND a ENVIRoN-
MENT, supra note 2, at 14 (Remarks of John Linster). See also id. at 12 (Remarks
of Warren Cooper).
40. MEDICAL MALPE ArcnE REORT 41-42; Gibbs, Medical Malpractice Insurance
Crisis, 80 CASE & COMMENT 8, 11 (1975).
41. For a general discussion of actuarial practice in medical professional liability,
see Kendall & Haldi, supra note 30, at 529-33.
42. For discussions of the importance of credibility in the insurance context, see
Mayerson, The Uses of Credibility in Property Insurance Ratemaking, 27 GIORNALE
DELL' IsTrrUto ITALiANO DEGLi AZrUAR 197 (1964). See also Bailey, Credibility Pro-
cedures, 37 PROCEEDINGS CASUALTY ACTUAIAL Soc. 7 (1950); Longley-Cook, An Intro-
duction to Credibility Theory, 49 PROCEEDINGS CASUALTY AcTuArmAL Soc. 194 (1962);
Mayerson, A Bayesian View of Credibility, 51 PROCEEDINGS CASUALTY ACTuARAL& Soc.
85 (1964).
43. Cf. Kendall & Haldi, supra note 30, at 531.
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"develops" them; that is, he accounts for reserve deficiencies or redun-
dancies and estimates what the historical losses will amount to when
they are all paid.44 He then turns his attention to what will probably
happen if these developed losses are paid some years later, as will be the
case under future rates. To quantify this consideration he uses a
"trend" factor,45 a very important calculation when inflation, changes
in the legal environment, and similar forces produce volatile loss costs,
in order to project the historical losses to a point in time when future
losses are expected to occur.
From the premiums under current rates, and his estimate of future
loss values that these rates are calculated to cover, the actuary next
calculates a loss ratio at current rates. By looking at known non-loss
costs as a function of past premiums and adjusting for expected or
known future changes, he can predict what percentage of future rates
will be needed to pay such non-loss expenses. The remainder is what
will be available to pay future losses, and is called the "expected loss
ratio." For instance, if expenses are estimated at twenty percent, eighty
percent of the future rate is available to pay claims.
The actuary next compares the loss ratio at current rates with the
expected loss ratio. If the former is the greater, rates must be raised to
provide the necessary dollars to pay future losses. Let us return to our
example. If the expected ratio is eighty percent and the ratio at current
rates is 100 percent, the rates must be raised by twenty-five percent.
Consider an average premium of $100 under current rates. In this
example it would lead to $100 of future loss, but this leaves the insurer
no money to pay non-loss expenses. If the rates are raised to $125, a
twenty-five percent increase, then eighty percent is $100, the amount
necessary for loss, and the other twenty percent of $25 is available for
non-loss expense.46 In like manner, if the expected ratio is the greater,
rates should be decreased.
44. See Lange, General Liability Insurance Ratemaking, 53 PROCEEDINS CASUALTY
ACTUARIAL Soc. 26, 32 (1966). See also Cook, Trend and Loss Development Factors,
57 PROCEMDINGS CASuALTY AcruAML Soc. 1, 2-3 (1970); Stem, Ratemaking Procedures
for Automobile Liability Insurance, 52 PROCEEDINGS CASUALTY AcruArtiA Soc. 137,
162 (1965).
45. See Lange, supra note 44, at 32. See generally Cook, supra note 44.
46. Another actuary might prefer a different approach, called the "pure premium"
method, which will lead him to the same result. A pure premium (perhaps better
called a loss cost) is a technical term to denote the average premium that must be col-
lected to pay for losses only, that is, a value that has no consideration for expense. It
is calculated by dividing the loss by the number of exposures. In the present case, this
second actuary will arrive at the developed, trended losses and divide by the historical
exposure count. The value in our example will be $100. Then he divides this by the
expected loss ratio, eighty percent, in order to "load" the expected future premium for
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Actuarial calculations thus involve three technical considerations,
credibility, development, and trending, which, while conceptually sim-
ple, may be quite complex in their derivation and computation. In
some lines of insurance this trinity is well-defined, with rather standard
procedures being generally accepted. Unfortunately, their definition in
malpractice insurance is anything but clear. Let us take a look at why
this is true.
First, as to credibility, the situation is alarmingly straightforward.
In most cases credibility has not been theoretically defined. The larger
state programs have by implication been considered fully credible
(though there is little uniformity in the number of years to be used in
the experience period), and even the experience of smaller states has
been accorded credibility, although companywide (or bureauwide) ad-
justments are made for development and trend. The last represents an
acknowledgment of lack of full credibility, but this nod is not a response
to any mathematical theory.
The number of medical exposures and claims, the statistics which
determine degrees of credibility, are miniscule in comparison with such
lines as automobile or homeowners insurance. For example, consider
the situation in a populous urban state, New Jersey. The rating bu-
reau's most recent filings for private passenger automobiles displayed an
annual count of about 1.1 million cars,4 7 while a companion homeown-
ers filing was based on an annual home count of about 700,000 units.48
In contrast, the company writing the medical society's program based its
independently devised rates on an annual census of less than 7,000
doctors,49 with hospital rates calculated from the experience of no more
than 110 hospitals.10 These comparisons are typical. Hence, the first
major uncertainty arises from the fact that the value of past data in pre-
dicting future losses is mathematically ill-defined and unclear.
The second consideration is loss development, which can be viewed
in two independent aspects. The first is what is known as "incurred but
not reported" losses, usually abbreviated IBNR.5" In any type of
expense. The answer, of course, is an average premium of $125, which breaks down
to $100 (eighty percent) for loss and $25 (twenty percent) for expense. Houston, The
Equivalence of the Pure Premium and the Loss Ratio Methods of Ratemaking, 23 J. RISK
& INS. 72 (1956).
47. Insurance Services Office, Filing with NJ. Insurance Dep't, effective Dec.
1975.
48. Insurance Services Office, Filing with N.J. Insurance Dep't, effective Aug.
1975.
49. Federal Insurance Co., Filing with N.J. Insurance Dep't, effective May 1975.
50. Insurance Services Office, Filing for N.J. Hospital Professional Liability Rates.
51. See generally Bornhuetter & Ferguson, The Actuary and IBNR, 59 PROCEEDINGS
CASUALTY AcTuARIuAL Soc. 181 (1972); Tarbell, Incurred But Not Reported Claim Re-
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insurance these will be claims presented after a policy has expired, but
their frequency is noticeably higher in the liability lines written on an
"occurrence" basis.52 Clearly, there can be many reasons why a claim-
ant may not discover an injury or press an early claim. The reasons for
late discovery seem apparent; those for late suits are more difficult to
perceive. Experience indicates that there are more reasons for delay in
the area of medical malpractice than other forms of insurance. To
illustrate the phenomenon of extended claims reporting (one of the
main factors contributing to the "long tail"), 53 statistics compiled by
a major state insurance department are helpful.54
Months from the Beginning Percent of Number
of a Policy Year 55  of Claims Reported
24 38
36 67
48 79
60 86
72 91
84 93
96 95
108 96
120 98
132 99
144 100
When all policies are expired, the table shows that only thirty-eight
percent of the claims have been reported; it is not until four years
thereafter that ninety percent are reported to the company. There are
two consequences to this. First, recent years of experience are all but
meaningless since so little of the data is known as fact. The actuary
thus loses the responsiveness to change that he cherishes in fresh data
when he sets out to price the malpractice policy. Second, even when he
deals with older years, the actuary must make substantial guesses as to
serves, 20 PROCEEDINGS CASUALTY AcT'uMIA Soc. 275 (1933-34), reprinted at 58 PRO-
CEEDiNGs CASUALTY AcTuAmrAL Soc. 84 (1972).
52. "Occurrence" means, simply, that the insurer providing liability coverage for a
specified period of time, usually a year, is liable for any accidents that occurred during
the period of time without regard to the date the claims are presented, subject, of course,
to the appropriate statute of limitations. See New Form of Malpractice Liability Cover-
age to be- Offered to Doctors, in MALPRACTICE DIsaT I (St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., Jan./Feb. 1975).
53. See, e.g., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 42. The term "long tail" refers to the
length of time between the policy period and the final determination of losses.
54. Data made available to the authors by participating private insurers.
55. The term "policy year" means experience on policies during a calendar year, for
instance 1975. A policy issued on January 1, 1975, would expire on December 31, 1975,
but a policy issued on December 31, 1975, would not expire until December 30, 1976.
Thus, losses in a given "policy year" are spread over two calendar years.
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what is yet to be reported. For instance, working in 1975 looking at
policy year 1971, he is aware of only two-thirds of the claims. It is this
magnitude of uncertainty that distinguishes the malpractice line.
The second aspect of development is what is called "run-off' '51 in
insurance jargon. When a claim is reported to the company, a member
of the claims staff, an examiner, sets up a case reserve against its future
disposition. The reserve is the examiner's best estimate, based on
current knowledge, of what the claim will cost when final payment is
made. In many lines of insurance the period between initial report and
disposition is relatively short, but in malpractice it can be a matter of
several years, averaging in excess of three years. 57 Given the nature of
inflation and its effect on trend,5 s it is unrealistic to think that examiners
can accurately calculate future liabilities, even in those rare cases where
the facts and allegations are known at first report. Generally, the
original reserves in bulk are insufficient to cover ultimate payments, a
fact which in and of itself does not frighten the actuarial mind-so long
as the degree of insufficiency is predictable, i.e. the presence of well-
defined patterns in the past that can be imputed to the future. Unfortu-
nately such consistency is not a hallmark of malpractice run-off. The
reason may be a change in carriers, each of whose claims staff sub-
scribes to a different philosophy of reserving. Or even where a single
carrier's experience is used for ratemaking there may be shifts in reserve
margins as examiners make corrections in case reserves in the course of
their continuing reviews of open claims files. In any event, the actuary,
if not frightened, is at least concerned and unsure.
The third area of actuarial uncertainty is trend. Over the last
several years, the frequency and size of claims have soared beyond any
actuarial expectations entertained during these years.59 For instance, in
Southern California the average size of a claim has jumped from less
than $6,000 in 1963 to over $12,000 in 1969, and is now estimated at
about $30,000.1° The frequency of claims has spiraled just as dramati-
56. "Run-off" is an estimate of a past reserve, and consists of actual future payments
on known claims up to a given date, plus anticipated remaining future payments on
known claims as of that given date. Skurnick, A Survey of Loss Reserving Methods,
60 PROCEEDINGS CASUALTY ACTUARIAL Soc. 16, 21-22 (1973). After a sufficient time
period, the run-off becomes fully accurate in most lines, either because all claims are
settled prior to the given date or because the open claims can be accurately reserved.
Id.
57. See Steves, Medical Malpractice in Perspective, 28 CPCU ANALs 209, 212
(Dec. 1975).
58. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
59. See Steves, supra note 57, at 213-15.
60. Data made available to the authors by private insurers.
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cally: nine out of 100 doctors had claims made against them in 1963,
twenty out of 100 in 1970, perhaps thirty out of 100 today. 1 Had
we been dealing with a consistent economic and legal inflation, our ac-
tuary could have predicted claims with some accuracy, but looking so
far ahead as he must when pricing (due to the long tail) he cannot
be blamed for not foreseeing that the rate of change in inflation was
shifting. Indeed, in retrospect the rate of change was linear when the
rates were made and became exponential when the claims were re-
ceived.
These three considerations-credibility, development, and trend
-are substantially less defined and predictable in medical malpractice
than in any other line, and inability to cope with them has led the
actuaries to their greatest failures. So much so, in fact, that the com-
pany which is perhaps the largest writer of malpractice in the country,
has declared the occurrence form unpriceable and has agreed to con-
tinue in the business only on a claims-made basis, by which it will cover
only claims presented in the year of coverage.6 2 Such a form bobs the
"tail" by eliminating claims (or at least incidents) incurred but not re-
ported during the policy year and by shortening the time between pre-
diction and payment. Other carriers are simply leaving the business.6 3
The crisis in the availability of malpractice insurance is due only in part
to past underwriting losses. Just as important is continuing and, per-
haps, unmanageable uncertainty about future pricing.
THE MEDICAL INSURANCE "CRISIS"
We are told that the past is a prologue to the future. From an
actuarial standpoint an unstable and unfortunate past does not portend
well for the future. A number of factors have combined to cause
malpractice liability costs to increase with unpredictable sharpness in
recent years. A consideration of those factors in juxtaposition with the
behavioral tendencies of insurers may suggest some helpful observations
about the future.
Causes
Why has malpractice liability expanded so dramatically, both in the
frequency and severity of claims? The first reason has to do with the
61. Id.
62. New Form of Malpractice Liability Coverage, supra note 52; N.Y. Times, Jan.
24, 1975, at 34, col. 1.
63. Business Week, Jan. 12, 1976, at 60, 64; N.Y. Times, June 10, 1975, at 78, col.
1; id., June 3, 1975, at 22, col. 8; id., June 2, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
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incidence of underlying loss. We do not doubt the validity of the oft-
made claim for the excellence of American medical care, at least for
those patients to whom it is financially available. Medical education is
as good as money can make it. Hospitals and laboratories are magnifi-
cently equipped. New drugs and procedures are extensively tested
before their general usage. Extensive research efforts produce an end-
less array of seemingly miraculous advances in technology. Yet we
suspect that the incidence of actual loss, in the sense of the original
definition we accorded to that term, 64 is relatively high, probably higher
than the volume of asserted malpractice claims indicates. 65 Even if the
juridical climate is as favorable to claimants as the provider groups
contend, 0 the negligence liability system undoubtedly continues to exert
a substantial filtering effect on claims. The technology of modem
medical care is incredibly complex. The total physiological effects of
much that is done are not always known or understood. Many of the
drugs and procedures employed involve narrow margins between effica-
cy and dangerousness. Very large numbers of professionals of various
types are engaged in the treatment process and, for a single condition,
the patient may be subjected to numerous professional and institutional
contacts and decisions. Many physicians, technologists, and institutions
have enormous patient contact loads and work under severe time pres-
sures.67  And finally, almost by definition the exposed population large-
ly consists of people who either have something wrong with them, or
think that they do, and submit to processes which they rarely fully
understand and under conditions which render them dependent and
even helpless to contribute to their own safety. There is reason to
64. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
65. See O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals,
59 VA. L. REV. 749, 757 (1973); Steves, supra note 57, at 210-15.
66. For examples of physician attitudes in this context, see Masur, Malpractice
Crisis, N.Y. STATE J. MED. 1554 (Aug. 1975); Wiseman, Res Ipsa Loquitur, W.J. MED.
71 (July 1975). The same attitude is visible in statements by insurers. See HousE Sun-
COMM. ON HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 17 (Remarks of John Linster).
67. Meeting the nation's health manpower needs is a problem which has not escaped
the attention of Congress. See Hearings on H.R. 2956, H.R. 2957, HR. 2958, and H.R.
3279 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 94-3- (1975); Hearings on
S. 3585 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3 (1974). See generally Ruhe, Recent Events of
Special Interest to Medical Education, 234 I.A.M.A. 1326, 1328 (1975). The imple-
mentation of a national health insurance program would likely have some impact on
physician workload; however, it is not at all clear whether such a plan would increase
or decrease the working hours of the physician. See Enterline, McDonald, McDonald,
et al., Physician's Working Hours and Patients Seen Before and After National Health
Insurance: "Free" Medical Care and Medical Practice, 13 MED. CARE 95 (1975).
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believe that the incidence of error, much of it undoubtedly harmless and
most of it not morally blameworthy, is higher than we would like to
believe.68
The second important factor is the extent to which the compensa-
tion process results in the transmutation of medical injury losses into
liability claims costs. This is a function of the combined and interactive
effect of legal doctrine and the behavior of claimants and their lawyers
in asserting claims, of insurers' representatives in settling or defending
them, and of judges and juries in deciding contested cases. At an
earlier time, not so long ago, successful recovery on medical malprac-
tice claims was difficult due to the substantial barriers erected by the
conventional requirements of the tort law doctrines and the obstacles
in acquiring knowledge of the technical facts involved and in securing
the requisite professional testimony. Moreover, patient expectations
were more modest and there was less propensity to assert claims. The
total process had the effect of suppressing and filtering the extent to
which medical injury losses became translated into compensated liabil-
ity claims.
Over the past twenty-five years, however, there has been a dra-
matic and apparently accelerating change in this state of affairs. The
various factors are chronicled elsewhere in this Symposium and need
not be analyzed here but the litany has become a familiar one: res
ipsa loquitur, informed consent, breaches in the locality rule, greater
availability of expert witnesses, relaxation in the application of the stat-
utes of limitations, expansion of doctrines facilitating multiple defend-
ant liability, open discovery, more sophisticated claimants' lawyers, en-
hanced public claims consciousness and a prevalent expectation of in-
68. Two recent studies indicate serious deficiencies in the quality of medical care.
A 1973-75 study made by the American College of Surgeons and the American Surgical
Association indicated that 796 of the 1,696 "untoward incidents" arising out of 1,493
surgical operations were avoidable. Eighty-five deaths were deemed avoidable. Child,
The Critical Incident Study of Surgical Deaths and Complications, 1973-1975 (10th and
final SOSSUS Report in the Study of Surgical Sciences for the United States), discussed
in Quality of Surgery Unveiled, MED. Woiu-D NEWS, Jan. 26, 1976, at 24. See also
Cohn, Surgical 'Incidents' Held Avoidable, Washington Post, Jan. 22, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
The results of a "self-assessment test" taken voluntarily by 4,513 physicians indi-
cated serious deficiencies of knowledge and a need for further education in the use of
antibiotics. The mean correct score on the National Antibiotic Therapy Test was sixty-
eight percent. Neu & Howrey, Testing the Physician's Knowledge of Antibiotic Use,
293 Nzw ENG. J. MED. 1291 (1975).
These quality-of-care studies are reflective of the results reached in a number of
earlier studies. See Brook, Brutoco & Williams, The Relationship Between Medical Mal-
practice and Quality of Care, 1975 DUE I. 1197. See also Pocincki, Dogger &
Schwartz, The Incidence of latrogenic Injuries, MEDIcAL MALPIACTICE REPoRT Ap-
pendix 50, 55.
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fallibility of the professionals and their miraculous technology, etc. The
cumulative effect of these changes in legal and cultural attitudes and
behavior has been a rapid evolution from suppression and filtration to-
ward encouragement and facilitation in the compensation of medical
injury losses through the insured tort system. In contemporary personal
injury law "negligence" often has little relation to moral culpability and
many claims are founded on the adverse consequences of routine error
and failure in the manipulation of the complex devices and processes
which dangerously abound in our technological and mechanized so-
ciety. Given the volume of underlying losses and the tendency toward
a general public expectation of assured results of professional perform-
ance, it is not likely that the trend in the volume and severity of claims
will be reversed.
In this climate, insurer managements, painfully aware of the ex-
tent to which they have repeatedly underestimated the trend of devel-
opment in the past and pressed by capacity needs to achieve consistent
underwriting soundness, may be expected to react to the uncertain fu-
ture by assuming that the trend will be in the direction of more claims
and awards arising from the failures of medical procedures to accomplish
desired results and to price the insurance accordingly.
Prescriptions
The purpose and obligation of this Article is to describe the
medical malpractice insurance problem in its insurance aspect, not to
prescribe solutions for it. Nevertheless, a few observations seem to flow
quite naturally from the preceding analysis of the situation.
The most basic and obvious observation is that the subject of
handling medical losses is far larger than its liability insurance aspect.
While insurance is often the device by which the costs of medical losses
are made most vivid to providers and patients, so that (as in the current
furor) dislocations in the handling of medical losses can be superficially
perceived as solely insurance problems, any systematic approach to the
subject must include its medical, legal, moral, and other aspects as well
as those of insurance.
Whatever we do now, a goodly amount of modesty and, indeed,
resignation is definitely called for. Since there is no longer any question
that the frequency and size of malpractice awards will continue to
increase so long as the present system remains intact, it follows that a
larger part of the cost of health care will have to be devoted to paying
medical losses than was the case in the past.
It follows, that is, unless society singles out one or more of the
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participants in the medical loss system for expropriation. A balanced
solution, designed to reduce loss costs by modifying the rights and duties
of many or all of the participants in the system, is one approach, and a
quite reasonable and not unlikely one. However, for any one of the
involved interest groups to seek to save its own interests by trampling on
the interests of other participants in the system is quite another matter.
Nor is the latter unheard of in the current excitement. With that in
mind, one should view with skepticism legal changes which would
unfairly force loss costs back onto the patient,"' insurance capacity
changes which would force insurers to subsidize the system,70 or insur-
ance coverage changes which would unfairly leave the physician unpro-
tected and the patient uncompensated.
Assuming that society is dissatisfied with the present level and
allocation of medical loss costs, a balanced approach to the problem
might consist of three parts; the first two are beyond the scope of this
Article, the third is the insurance aspect.
The first part would be better control of medical losses themselves.
It cannot be questioned that many of today's insured medical losses re-
sult from the failure of some health care professionals to meet the
standards of professional competence to which society quite justly holds
them. Some of these situations would seem to be avoidable by, for
example, tighter regulation of health care providers, peer review in
questionable cases, and closer surveillance by medical societies and
practicing physicians' groups.
The second would be to re-examine the legal rules governing the
right to recover for medical losses and the amount of that recovery, as
well as the role and compensation of the legal profession in the medical
loss cost-allocation system. This re-examination would certainly have to
include such questions as limitations on recovery for pain and suffering,
limitations on contingent fees for attorneys, and modification of the rule
that damages are to be measured without regard to funds received from
collateral sources."'
69. See Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-Has Its Time Come?, 1975
DuKn L.J. 1233. For a discussion of state legislative limitations on provider liability or
patient recovery, see Comment, State Legislative Responses, supra note 1, at 1418-24.
70. North Carolina has ordered all general liability insurers authorized to write cov-
erage in the state to participate in a reinsurance program for medical professional liabil-
ity. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-173.34 to .51 (1975 Supp.). The statute has been chal-
lenged by insurers, and a state court has found the plan unconstitutional. State Farm
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 44 U.S.L.W. 2255 (N.C. Super. Ct., Dec. 9, 1975).
71. For a discussion of recent state legislative developments in these areas, see Com-
ment, State Legislative Responses, supra note 1, at 1442-50.
We recognize that all of these possibilities involve troublesome questions of overall
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The third part of a balanced solution concerns insurance and, in
turn, consists of two aspects. The first is designed to reduce the
uncertainty in malpractice liability ratemaking, both in the interest of
fairness to insured and insurer and in the interest of reducing the
uncertainty as to financial result which has made insurer managements
so fearful of this line. It merely involves applying to the malpractice
situation the familiar insurance techniques of policyholder dividends or
retrospective, experienced-based rating. These techniques are widely
used in large commercial property and casualty coverages today,72 and,
indeed, have been used on a small scale in medical malpractice itself.
Granted that the "long tail" of medical malpractice losses renders the
making of rates most inexact and susceptible to huge errors,73 this
approach would simply involve setting the initial premium rate at the
high end of everyone's best guess as to the correct rate and then, after a
suitable loss development period and pursuant to prior agreement as to
the ultimate profit or loss to the insurer, having the insurer refund to the
legal policy. Of paramount concern is the question of the propriety of singling out the
area of health care provider liability for extraordinarily favorable legal treatment. If
these measures are sound limitations on medical malpractice liability, then why are they
not equally appropriate as limitations on claims against product manufacturers, lawyers,
plumbers, or automobile drivers? After all, the dispersal of the costs ultimately to the
public as a whole is not likely to be demonstrably different.
The related questions of limitation on general, or "pain and suffering" damages, and
on contingent fees pointedly pose the issue. Clearly, these features of the legal process
in personal harm cases create opportunities for jury awards far in excess of economic
loss and strong incentives for lawyers to pursue those opportunities energetically. And
the large element of "juridical hazard" with which the liability and damage issues in
these cases are infected significantly affects the settlement practices of insurers. A sub-
stantial portion of the recoveries through this system goes to lawyers. See Dietz, Baird
& Berul, The Medical Malpractice Legal System, in MEDIcAL MALPRAcInCE REPORT Ap-
pendix 87, 105-06. We recognize, therefore, that the right to unlimited pain and suffer-
ing damages, coupled with the contingent fee system, creates a situation which is sus-
ceptible to abuse and in some cases may foster undesirable behavior by lawyers, claim-
ants, and insurers. Yet we should honestly admit that to single out the medical profes-
sion as beneficiary of special immunities from pursuit by lawyers does seem to establish
a ring of protection around what must be our country's highest paid profession, simply
to protect it from the alleged depredations of another of the country's highest paid pro-
fessions. If we want to solve these problems, as we should, we should do so systemat-
ically and not subject by subject. Thus, in "solving" the contingent fee problem, one
has to come to grips with the reasons for its existence. Liability cases, particularly in
technical and professional fields, require the expenditure of considerable time, effort and
money by claimants' attorneys. Until our society is prepared to find other ways of as-
suring that lawyers who represent claimants will be reasonably compensated in all cases,
drastic limitation of contingent fees may lead to effective denial of representation in
many cases.
72. See R. Mmm & E. CAmmAcK, supra note 16, at 812-15; J. MAGEE & D. BicK-L-
HPTmu, GENMRAL INsuRANcE 435-36 (7th ed. 1964).
73. See notes 51-63 supra and accompanying text.
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insured physician, medical society, medical group, or whatever, the
amount of premium that was left over after the losses were paid. While
mechanically rather complex, this approach is conceptually simple and
would seem to have the desired effect of having the insured profession
carry its own liability costs, without the capitalization and management
problems which beset attempts by physicians to organize a mutual
company themselves. 74
The foregoing insurance rating approach might well be coupled
with a coverage change which would offer some hope of controlling
losses as well as paying for them. Such a change is somewhat beyond
the knowledge of the writers of this Article, but its general outlines
would be as follows. A large portion of malpractice claims arise out of
procedures performed in hospitals.75 Hospitals carry malpractice insur-
ance and it would be possible to provide by law that the hospital's
insurance must cover any claim arising out of a hospital procedure, that
the physician's insurance would not apply, and that the hospital would
have no claim against the physician. Hospitals are large institutions
better able to withstand financial shocks than are individual practition-
ers. They are the best instrumentality we now have for policing the
professional conduct of physicians, and the contemplated insurance
change would give them every incentive to be more vigilant. Finally,
their institutional continuity would suit them better than an individual
practitioner to the sort of long-term retrospective rating program de-
scribed above.76
As the reader can see from the analysis in this Article of the
insurance aspects of the medical malpractice problem, as well as from
the other articles in this issue, all that is certain about our three propos-
als is that they would leave a great many people quite unhappy. Fortu-
nately, however, the problem is today the object of so much raging
discontent that those dissatisfied with our, or any other, moderately
reasonable program could scarcely be more numerous, more vigorous,
or more vocal than they are today. As we noted at the outset, the
medical malpractice insurance problem is not complex; it is merely
intractable.
74. Mutual companies have been formed in San Francisco and Los Angeles, Survey
Shows Gains in Liability Legislation, But Problems Remain, AM. MED. NEws, Jan. 12,
1976, at 9, and similar attempts are underway in many other areas. Id. at 9-13.
75. Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, supra note 39, at 10.
76. See Steves, A Proposal to Improve the Cost to Benefit Relationship in the Medi-
cal Professional Liability Insurance System, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1305, 1325.
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